V. Only the Remedy of Dismissal Can Adequately Redress Plaintiff’s Misconduct.

The foregoing demonstrates clear and convincing proof that Plaintiff intentionally posted confidential documents on the Internet in violation of this Court’s Order, filed a perjurious affidavit denying any relevant knowledge of the violation, misdirected the Court as to that knowledge, and then fabricated a false affirmative defense to blame everything on his wife.

In the face of that evidence, there is no remedy short of dismissal which will effectively deter parties from enlisting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and then mocking and underminingits integrity and authority through fraudulent schemes such as the attempted cover-up that hasbeen perpetrated before this Court over the past year and a half.

Seventh Circuit precedent instructs that when a court is considering the appropriate sanction for misconduct, it should generally consider whether some sanction short of dismissal with prejudice is fair and appropriate. REP MCR Realty, L.L.C. v. Lynch, 363 F. Supp. 2d 984, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

But, in cases such as this, where the plaintiff’s conduct includes flagrant disregard of discovery orders and perjury, courts consistently find dismissal with prejudice is the only appropriate remedy. See, e.g., id. (granting motion for sanctions and dismissing with prejudice where plaintiff fabricated documents and perjured himself in affidavit submitted to court and testimony at sanctions hearing); Jackson v. Murphy, 468 Fed. App’x 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding district court was within its discretion in exercising its inherent power to sanction prisoner by dismissing claims for filing false document and lying to court about it); Jimenez v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 321 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff fabricated critical documents); Oliver v. Gramley, 200 F.3d 465, 466 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding district court did not have to consider less severe sanction before dismissing habeas petition with prejudice as sanction for fraud on the court); Quela v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., No. 99 C 1904, 2000 WL 656681, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2000) (dismissing case in response to creation of false witness statements and perjury); Rodriguez v. M&M/Mars, No. 96 C 1231, 1997 WL 349989, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 1997) (dismissing case with prejudice and stating “false testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable”) (quoting ABF Freight Sys, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S 317, 323 (1994)). “Not to dismiss a case for such blatant disregard of the judicial process would ‘erode the public’s confidence in the outcome of judicial decision, call into question the legitimacy of courts, and threaten the entire judicial system.’”

Rhodes v. LaSalle Bank, No. 02 C 2059, 2005 WL 281221, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2005) (quoting Dotson v. Bravo, 202 F.R.D. 559, 573 (N.D. Ill. 2001)); see also Salmeron v. Enterprise Recovery Sys., Inc., 579 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2009) (in affirming dismissal under court’s inherent authority for leaking confidential materials to Wikileaks, court held “[s]anctions meted out pursuant to the court’s inherent power are appropriate where the offender has willfully abused the judicial process or otherwise conducted the litigation in bad faith.”) Indeed, a search of Seventh Circuit case law did not produce any cases in which a court found a party intentionally lied to the court and then issued a remedy less than dismissal with prejudice.

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Part 15 tomorrow.