McHenry County Blog

I didn’t attend the McHenry County Mental Health Board Tuesday night, but someone who was present tells me there was considerable attention given to attorney Frank Gosser’s bill.

At the 708 Board Finance Committee on May 16th, new member Rob Routzahn, a former Crystal Lake Grade School Board member, said,

“The only bill I want to see every month is Frank Gosser’s, the attorney’s.”

Here’ is the bill Gosser submitted on May 17th:

The 708 Board will hold a retreat staring this afternoon at 4 at its Crystal Lake office.

September 19th is the day that Algonquin attorney Jason Smiekel will learn his fate in his murder-for-hire scheme.

He plead guilty in mid-April.  Here’s the paperwork.

You can find his indictment here.

The affidavit that got him arrested is here.

in my quest to discover what’s happening on the “let’s put a branch courthouse in the population center of McHenry County,” I have received some information from 22nd Circuit Court Administrator Dan Wallis:

“The requirements that we have put together are for an area of about 6,000 square feet to accommodate the courtroom, holding area, clerks, court administration, chambers, etc.

“The largest issue is the required parking which we are estimating around 120 parking spaces or more.

“There are plenty of large buildings in the 60,000 square foot range which have ample parking or there are buildings in the 6,000 foot range which have forty parking spaces.

“It is a difficult combination to find.”

At the suggestion of a reader, I also asked about the possibility of night courts for traffic or other purposes. Wallis’ reply follows:

“There are very few night court models around the country.

“I have discussed that issue with the National Center for State Courts and was told that they work only for a very small group of case types.

“One main issue is that it isn’t just the court that is affected by a night court.

“It involves the

• attorneys,
• litigants,
• security/sheriff’s office,
• court services,
• circuit clerk’s office and
• facilities management.

The Grafton Township Board wasn’t unanimous in its decisions Thursday night, but there was enough cooperation to pass two motions concerning the potential sale of the Haligus Road property purchased by the previous Board where a new township hall was planned.

After a closed door meeting which at time reached quite high decibels discussing subjects other than the sale of the real estate and the hiring of “special counsel (hence, the asterisk in the headline above),” the Board actually passed motions with Supervisor Linda Moore and Trustee Robert LaPorta on the same side.

Although the purchase offer was not revealed, it had to be less than the counteroffer of $120,000, plus expenses.  A motion to that effect was passed 4-1, with only Trustee Betty Zirk voting in the negative

One would assume the expenses would be the cost of hiring real estate attorney Michael Torchalski. plus an appraisal and maybe even the For Sale sign.  On that motion, Jerry McMahon and Betty Zirk voted, “No,” while Township Supervisor Linda Moore and Trustees Rob LaPorta and Barb Murphy voted in favor.

When asked after the meeting by the Northwest Herald reporter if the prospective purchaser was the American Muslim Community Organization, none of the Board members would say.

The amount proposed to be paid by the interested party was not revealed either.

I filed a Freedom of Information request for both

• the offer, which was discussed by the Supervisor and Trustees, and
• the resolution hiring the attorney.

I am confident that the two documents were put in the public domain by the actions that the Board took in open session.

Several Board members said they would have to ask their attorney.

I pointed out they did not have one, except for real estate.

LaPorta said he had one who would provide free advice.

Woodstock defense attorney Mark Gummerson was the man that Algonquin attorney Jason Smiekel got to represent him when Federal agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Explosives arrested him in a murder-for-hire plot the first week of August.

Gummerson withdrawal from the case was approved on August 26.

That day he was replaced by three Chicago attorneys:

• Darryl Goldberg
• Ralph Meczyk
• Mark Martin

Monday, Smiekel asked to be released from jail for the second time.

The first time Magistrate Michael Mahoney agreed with the idea, but the U.S. Attorney’s Office appealed and won a decision from Judge Frederick J. Kapala to continue pre-trial detention.
As was the case in second week of August, his request was denied.

Below is the ruling by Judge Kapala:

Defendant, Jason W. Smiekel, an attorney licensed in the State of llinois, is charged by indictment with seven counts of the use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958.

These offenses are class C felonies punishable by terms of imprisonment of not more than 10 years on each count.

On August 11, 2011, this court ordered defendant detained pending trial after revoking the pretrial release order issued by the magistrate judge on August 10, 2011. Defendant now moves pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145 to revoke the detention order. The motion is denied.

On August 11, 2011, this court held that the government proved by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community. Specifically, in consideration of the applicable § 3142(g) factors, this court found that

1. the charged offense qualified as a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(A), and defendant had not argued otherwise;
2. the government’s case against the defendant is strong;
3. defendant’s favorable history and characteristics do not outweigh the other factors strongly weighing in favor of detention; and
4. the nature and seriousness of the danger in the case is of the gravest type, the possible loss of human life.

The court agreed with the government that the ordered conditions of pretrial release,1 including home incarceration under electronic monitoring, were not conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of any other person because they were reactionary measures which would not prevent defendant, who had demonstrated a persistent willingness to terminate the life of people who interfere with his desires, from continuing his efforts to have the intended victim killed.

In support of the instant motion, defendant takes issue with two of this court’s previous rulings.

• First, he argues that the government has not proven that no set of release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.
• Second, he argues that this is not a case in which the government is authorized to seek detention because the crime set forth in § 1958 is not a “crime of violence.”

In response to defendant’s motion, the government argues that defendant has failed to meet the standard for reopening a detention hearing. The court agrees.

Section 3142(f) provides:

The hearing may be reopened, before or after a determination by the judicial officer, at any time before trial if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant
at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Defendant maintains that he is now in a position to proffer additional matters not previously presented:

1. his grandmother will post her unencumbered home valued at approximately $250,000;
2. he consents to the government monitoring his mother’s home telephone;
3. he agrees not to possess, use or access any computer;
4. he will not have any visitors other than counsel and U.S. Pretrial Services Officers;
5. he agrees not to engage in electronic communications of any kind; and
6. he offers additional third-party custodians.

Although these newly suggested conditions of release are material to the question of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community, the court cannot conclude that they are based on information unknown to the defendant at the time of his detention hearing before the magistrate judge on August 10, 2011, or when this court revisited the issue de novo on August 11, 2011.

Defendant’s agreement to consent to additional release conditions (2) through (5), as well as his suggestion that three additional individuals will serve as third-party custodians, do not constitute information that was not known to him at the time of the earlier proceedings.

Likewise, as to additional condition (1), defendant must have known about his grandmother’s home and, at minimum, knew of the potential that she would post the asset in an effort to secure his release.

Defense counsel argues that defendant’s former counsel chiefly practices in state court where pledging real estate is very uncommon and, consequently, did not think to suggest this condition earlier.

Whether defendant’s former counsel actually knew about this possibility is unknown. Nevertheless, the standard is knew or should have known. See United States v. Taylor, No. 1:06CR111-1, 2007 WL 580627, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 21, 2007) (applying should have known standard in § 3142(f)(2) new information analysis). This court judicially notices that defendant’s former counsel has been a member of this court’s trial bar since 1985 and as such is certainly charged with knowledge of § 3142(c)(B)(xi).2 Consequently, the court concludes that defendant has produced no new information that was not known to the him at the time of the earlier proceedings. This being so, defendant has failed to establish that the detention hearing should be reopened.

Even assuming for argument’s sake that defendant has satisfied the criteria for reopening a detention hearing, and assuming that the suggested conditions could be implemented, these conditions would not change the judgment of this court that there are no conditions of release which will reasonably assure that defendant will not harm any other person or the community. In addition to the findings this court already made in its order of August 11, as discussed below, the court makes additional findings regarding the applicable § 3142(g) factors using the clear and convincing evidence standard of § 3142(f)(2).

As an initial matter, the court notes that, in addition to the conditions of release previously ordered and those suggested by defendant, the court has considered all the conditions of release listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(i) through (xiv) in order to comply with its obligation to consider the possibility of less restrictive alternatives to detention. The court is mindful that defendant is presumed innocent during these proceedings.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j). However, the court continues to believe that the evidence presented by the government in its evidentiary proffer demonstrates a strong case.

Defendant argues that this court overlooked the nature of the right to bail by basing its decision on only the nature of the offense and the strength of the evidence.

This is not true.

The court balanced all the applicable § 3142(g) factors and concluded that no set of conditions of release could reasonably assure the safety of the intended victim because:

[s]uch measures are reactionary and not preventative and defendant has demonstrated a willingness to terminate the life of people who interfere with his desires, including the intended victim and ostensibly the two hit men who took his money. Even under home confinement and electronic monitoring defendant would have at his disposal various ways of continuing his efforts to have the intended victim killed.

While the investigation of any harm done to the intended victim or any witness in this case would certainly be focused on defendant, any deterrent effect this creates is overshadowed by defendant’s persistence over the past seven months to have the intended victim killed.

The newly suggested conditions, like those previously ordered, are also reactionary and do not provide the court with a reasonable assurance of the intended victim’s safety in view of defendant’s persistent effort to take another’s life over a seven-month period as discussed in this court’s previous order.

The most vigorously debated new condition is the suggestion that defendant’s grandmother would agree to forfeit her $250,000 home should defendant violate a condition of release. Defense counsel calls this condition “moral suasion,” explaining that defendant is not likely to do anything to jeopardize his grandmother’s retirement.

However, in the court’s view, the fact that defendant’s grandmother is willing to pledge her home to secure defendant’s release says much about how important defendant is to her, but says nothing about defendant’s affection for his grandmother.

Counsel’s “moral suasion” argument, like his argument that it is very unlikely that defendant, now standing accused, will do anything to make his situation worse, does not hold up if defendant actually considers himself backed in a corner with nothing to loose.

Newly suggested conditions (3) through (5) are not materially different than the conditions of release previously ordered by the magistrate judge and subsequently found insufficient by this court. In addition, the court notes that defendant is a lawyer and as such is charged with knowledge of the law including the law prohibiting the use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire.

Despite this knowledge, the government proffers a strong case that defendant persisted in his efforts to have the intended victim killed for a seven-month period.

As such, defendant’s proffer that he agrees to various conditions of release does not give the court any comfort that he will abide by them.

Condition (2), tapping and listening to defendant’s mother’s land line, which is necessary to operate any electronic monitoring device, was not previously suggested. The government states that monitoring this line would require an agent to work around the clock, cost thousands of dollars, and that it is not fair to place that burden on the government.

In response, defendant claims that there is software available which could be used to monitor the line such that 24-hour-a-day man power would not be required. Due to the uncertainty and lack of evidence on the feasibility of this condition, the court cannot determine if it could be implemented. However, even assuming that this condition could be utilized in a cost effective way, it is still a reactionary measure and does not afford the court sufficient assurance of the intended victim’s safety.

Condition (6), defendant’s offer of the services of three additional third-party custodians, would only provide the court with three additional people bound to report defendant’s deviations from the conditions of release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(i). However, should defendant continue his efforts to have the intended victim killed, whether there is one report of the violation or four, it will likely be too late to assure his safety.

In sum, based on the foregoing findings as well as those made in this court’s previous order, the court cannot conclude that the proposed conditions of release are sufficient to overcome the safety concerns previously stated. Clearly, detention may be ordered based upon a finding that the defendant is likely to continue to engage in criminal activity which poses a threat to the safety of the particular person. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 772 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1985).

As for defendant’s contention that this court erred in concluding that the offense charged qualifies as a crime of violence, it is without merit.

The federal murder-for-hire statute requires the government to prove that the accused intended for a murder to be committed “as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). Crime of violence means:

(A) an offense that has an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another; [or]

(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(A) & (B).

Obviously, murder under Illinois law involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1. Consequently, one need not look beyond the plain language of § 3156(a)(4)(A) to conclude that the charged offense is a crime of violence.

In addition, the government points out that several courts have explicitly found that a violation of § 1958(a) is a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A). See United States v. Barnett, 986 F. Supp. 385, 395 (W.D. La. 1997); United States v. Ouedraogo, No. 1:08-cr-68, 2009 WL 3270076, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 8, 2009); United States v. Ross, No. 1:05-CR-160, 2007 WL 1295995, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2007). Thus, there was no error in determining that defendant is charged with a crime of violence and is thereby subject to pretrial detention.

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies defendant’s motion to revoke the detention order previously ordered by this court.

= = = = =

FN1. In addition to the standard conditions of pretrial release and a $4,500 recognizance bond, the magistrate judge imposed the following conditions: (1) the defendant must live at the residence of his mother and stepfather; (2) his mother to serve as a third-party custodian of the defendant; (3) the defendant surrender his FOID card and passport; (4) no firearms are allowed in his mother’s residence; (5) he have no contact with any potential witnesses or alleged intended victims; and (6) he is on “home incarceration” with electronic monitoring at defendant’s expense.

FN2. This section provides for the “execut[ion of] an agreement to forfeit upon failing to appear as required, property of a sufficient unencumbered value, including money, as is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person as required, and shall provide the court with proof of ownership and the value of the property along with information regarding existing encumbrances as the judicial office may require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(xi)

Haven’t seen this before.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office references the use of a Lexus in its indictment of Algonquin attorney Jason Smiekel.

It is described as “a facility of interstate commerce.”

Take a look at Count 2 below:

COUNT TWO

The SEPTEMBER 2010 GRAND JURY further charges:

On or about August 1, 2011, in Lake County, in the Northern District of Illinois, and elsewhere,

JASON W. SMIEKEL,

defendant herein, with the intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of the State of Illinois as consideration for the receipt of and as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value, did use a facility of interstate commerce, namely a Lexus automobile;

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958.

His use of a cell phone is also four of the seven counts; his use of the Lexus in the other three.  All are in McHenry and Lake Counties.

Here is the paperwork for the murder for hire arrest of Algonquin lawyer Jason W. Smiekel:

= = = = =

See also Aug 11, 2011, court order about Smiekel’s being kept in jail.

= = = = =

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS )
) ss.
WESTERN DIVISION )
AFFIDAVIT

I, Sarah A. Tucker, being duly sworn, depose and state the following:

1. I am a Special Agent (“S/A”) for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), United States Department of Justice, and have been so employed since September 2003. I am currently assigned to the Rockford Satellite Office, conducting investigations involving the unlawful possession and/or sale of firearms and narcotics. My formal education includes a B.A. in Criminology received from Northern Illinois University and an M.A. in Law Enforcement and Justice Administration from Western Illinois University. I have also successfully completed the Criminal Investigator Training Program and the ATF New Professional Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.

2. This affidavit is submitted in support of the issuance of a complaint against JASON W. SMIEKEL for using an interstate commerce facility in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958. I make this affidavit with personal knowledge based on my participation in this investigation, including

• witnesses I interviewed or which were interviewed by other law enforcement agents,
• communications with others who have personal knowledge of the events and circumstances described herein, and
• information gained through my training and experience.

The information outlined below is provided for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause and does not contain all of the details or facts relating to this investigation of which I am aware.

3. This Affidavit describes portions of recorded and unrecorded conversations. To the extent that such communications are summarized, those summaries do not necessarily refer to all of the topics covered during the conversation.

In addition, the summaries do not include every conversation made by each speaker on the topic being described. Portions of the conversations that are quoted are preliminary quotations and may be modified upon further review. For some conversations, I have offered in parentheses my understandings and/or interpretations of the conversation. My understandings and/or interpretations are based upon my experience and knowledge of the investigation to date, the content and context of the conversations, the experience of other ATF Special Agents with whom I have consulted, and my training and experience as a Special Agent.

The Cooperating Individual

4. On Saturday, July 30, 2011, ATF S/A Dan Ivancich and I met with a cooperating individual (hereafter the “CI”) who provided the following information:

a. On Wednesday, July 27th, 2011, he had been approached by an individual he knows as “Jason.” Jason drives a white Lexus and resides on Sandy Creek Drive in Algonquin, Illinois. Jason said he wanted to have an individual (hereinafter referred to as “intended victim”) murdered in order to prevent the intended victim from giving damaging testimony in a proceeding.

b. Jason is an attorney and had recently represented his girlfriend in her divorce case. Jason indicated his girlfriend’s ex-husband, the intended victim, has information about Jason that could get Jason in trouble and lead to a criminal indictment. Jason had wanted to have the intended victim killed prior to a court appearance that was scheduled to be held on Friday, July 29, 2011.

c. Jason said he previously paid two males a total of $8,000 to murder the intended victim, with the understanding that an additional $7,000 would be paid upon completion of the task. Jason indicated that the two males took off with the $8,000 and never committed the murder. Jason asked if the CI could “get it done” and Jason indicated that he was willing to pay up to $25,000 for the murder.

d. On Thursday, July 28, 2011, Jason again approached the CI.Jason asked, “What do you got for me?” and stated, “I’m willing to do the 25. What do you need?” Jason reiterated that the intended victim has evidence that would completely destroy Jason and that Jason needed something done by the following day.

The CI told Jason that nothing would happen that quickly. On Friday, July 29, 2011, Jason called the CI’s cell phone. Jason indicated that he had been able to buy himself more time in regards to the court date.

5. The CI showed S/A Ivancich and me the call log on the CI’s cellular phone and advised that Jason had used phone number (815) 909-5500 to call the CI. The CI indicated that Jason had called the CI two times on the morning of July 30, 2011, but the CI had not answered the phone. In looking at the CI’s telephone, I  observed two missed calls from (815) 909-5500 which were received at 9:26 a.m. and 10:50 a.m. on July 30, 2011.

6. The CI agreed to make a recorded phone call to Jason in order to attempt to arrange for another meeting. In the presence of agents, the CI made a recorded call to (815) 909-5500, and then indicated that the call went to voicemail.

Approximately thirty minutes later, the CI advised me that he had received a call from Jason, who had relayed that he was currently out of town but would be willing to meet the following day.

7. I conducted an inquiry of Lexis/Nexis, an informational database, and learned that JASON W. SMIEKEL was associated with the same address on Sandy Creek Drive in Algonquin, Illinois, as had been provided by the CI. A driver’s license inquiry confirmed that SMIEKEL fit the physical description provided by the CI.

When I showed the CI a photograph of JASON W. SMIEKEL that I had obtained though the driver’s license inquiry, the CI positively identified the photograph as the individual the CI knew as Jason. The CI advised that he has known Jason as an acquaintance for 4 to 5 years.

July 31, 2011 Meeting

8. On Sunday, July 31, 2011, the CI advised S/A Ivancich and me that the CI had spoken with SMIEKEL earlier that day and that the CI had asked if they could meet that evening. I looked at the call log on the CI’s phone and it indicated an outgoing call to (815) 909-550 at 11:10 a.m. and an incoming call from (815) 909-5500 at 11:16 a.m. At approximately 6:16 p.m., at my request, the CI made a recorded phone call to (815) 909-5500 and spoke with SMIEKEL. During the call, SMIEKEL said he was currently unavailable but could meet with the CI at 8:00 p.m. that evening.

Later that day, S/A Ivancich and I gave the CI with two covert recording devices to use during the meeting. We told the CI to advise SMIEKEL that the CI knew an individual named “Chris” who would be willing to complete the task (referring to the murder for hire) that SMIEKEL had discussed.

9. On the evening of July 31, 2011, the CI had a recorded meeting with SMIEKEL. After the meeting, S/A Ivancich and I met with the CI. The CI turned over the recording equipment to S/A Ivancich, and provided a piece of torn white paper with handwriting in blue ink. The CI said SMIEKEL had written the intended victim’s name on the piece of paper along with a phone number that “Chris” was to use to contact SMIEKEL.

The piece of paper contained the intended victim’s name, address in McHenry County, Illinois, and place of employment. The piece of paper also contained telephone number (213) 509-0487.

The CI said that SMIEKEL still wanted to pay someone to kill the intended victim and had written the intended victim’s name and address on the provided piece of paper.

The CI said SMIEKEL had again discussed how he had tried to have this done (via the previously mentioned unknown males) in February 2011. SMIEKEL said he wanted it completed by Friday, August 5, 2011. SMIEKEL was receptive to meeting with “Chris” and requested that “Chris” call SMIEKEL on the phone number on the piece of paper. I reviewed the recordings of the meeting between the CI and SMIEKEL. While the audio was recorded, the video did not record the meeting.

While reviewing the audio recording of the meeting, I confirmed the information provided by the CI during the debriefing.

During the meeting SMIEKEL said his last name was SMIEKEL. SMIEKEL again indicated that the intended victim was about to “ruin” SMIEKEL and that SMIEKEL had been reported to the ARDC. I know from my experience and training that ARDC is commonly used to refer to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

SMIEKEL asked about the proposed cost saying, “I need to be ready money-wise.”

10. On Monday, August 1, 2011, I conducted an online query in the McHenry County Circuit Clerk Online Public Case Access system. The system indicated that the intended victim is currently listed as a defendant in a family court matter in McHenry County. I also conducted an online query of the Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission which lists SMIEKEL as a licensed attorney in the State of Illinois. However, under the heading of “Public Record of Discipline and Pending Proceedings” was listed “none”.

August 1, 2010, ATF Undercover Meeting

11. On Monday, August 01, 2011, ATF S/A Chris Bayless, acting in an undercover capacity posing as a “hitman,” called cell phone number (213) 509-0487 and spoke with SMIEKEL. During the recorded conversation, SMIEKEL agreed to meet that evening at a restaurant on Randall Road in Elgin, Illinois. At approximately 6:50 p.m., S/A Bayless entered the parking lot at the restaurant. S/A Bayless called SMIEKEL on the cellular phone and described the type of vehicle S/A Bayless was in. Shortly thereafter, SMIEKEL walked out of a restaurant and got into S/A Bayless’s undercover car. S/A Bayless and SMIEKEL drove around. I have reviewed the video and audio recordings of the meeting and the following summarizes the meeting:

a. SMIEKEL introduced himself as “Jason” and got into S/A Bayless’s car. S/A Bayless asked SMIEKEL what he had going on. SMIEKEL said there was a guy who was causing SMIEKEL family problems and problems with his livelihood. SMIEKEL said six months ago he had foreseen troubles and had gone to someone else, but that SMIEKEL had been ripped off. S/A Bayless said that he wasn’t sure whether he wanted the job but that for the right price, anything could get taken care of.

b. SMIEKEL said he had a time problem and that the intended victim had “dirt” on SMIEKEL that could ruin SMIEKEL’S career. SMIEKEL said there was no other solution (meaning that the victim had to be killed).

SMIEKEL identified the locations of the intended victim’s place of employment
and health club. S/A Bayless said it would cost about “twenty” (meaning $20,000).

SMIEKEL discussed how he could obtain the money to pay S/A Bayless and
agreed to pay $1,500 of the fee up front. SMIEKEL described the physical
appearance of the intended victim and agreed to provide a photograph of the
intended victim to S/A Bayliss. They agreed to meet the following day at the same restaurant.

August 2, 2011 ATF Undercover Meeting

12. On August 2, 2011, at approximately 11:39 a.m., S/A Bayless received a telephone call from (213) 509-0487. S/A Bayless did not answer and the call went to voicemail. He activated a recording device and called SMIEKEL back at (213) 509-0487. SMIEKEL indicated he was running late and would be at the restaurant at approximately 12:45 p.m. At approximately 12:39 p.m., SMIEKEL used cellular number (213) 509-0487 to call S/A Bayless. During the call,
SMIEKEL indicated that he had arrived at the restaurant. S/A Bayless entered the parking lot in an undercover vehicle and parked. S/A Bayless went into the restaurant, met briefly with SMIEKEL, and they both went to S/A Bayless’s car.

The meeting was recorded both for audio and video. I have reviewed the video and audio recordings of the meeting and the following summarizes the meeting:

a. SMIEKEL had obtained a different phone and had S/A Bayless use his cell phone to call SMIEKEL’S new phone number, (818) 235-3945.

SMIEKEL gave S/A Bayless an envelope containing a small photograph of the intended victim and $1,500 in currency. S/A Bayless said he had already put “things in motion,” and that he planned on making it look like the murder stemmed from a robbery. SMIEKEL said that he would have part of the money on Friday and they discussed how SMIEKEL would later pay the remainder. S/A Bayless said that he would call SMIEKEL when “it’s done” (meaning the murder had been committed).

b. S/A Bayless said that if he got an earlier opportunity to kill the intended victim, he would take advantage of that and would call SMIEKEL after the murder.

SMIEKEL agreed to get $5,000 to pay S/A Bayless as early as the following day. Otherwise, S/A Bayless would try to kill the intended victim by Thursday and SMIEKEL agreed to try and pay S/A Bayless $10,000 right after the murder with the rest of the fee to be paid later. The meeting ended with S/A Bayless saying he would call SMIEKEL when the intended victim was dead.

August 4, 2011

13. Beginning at approximately 2:05 p.m. on August 4, 2011, S/A Bayless and SMIEKEL had a series of telephone calls with SMIEKEL using the cell phone (818) 235-3945.

During these calls, S/A Bayless asked whether SMIEKEL had the money and SMIEKEL said that he had $7,000. S/A Bayless asked whether SMIEKEL wanted to drive by the scene of the murder in order to confirm that the intended victim had died and SMIEKEL indicated that he did not want to do so.

SMIEKEL said that he trusted S/A Bayless and would provide the $7,000 up front.

They agreed to meet at the same restaurant on Randall Road at 4:30 p.m. later that
day.

14. At approximately 4:17 p.m., S/A Bayless and SMIEKEL met in a parking lot of the restaurant on Randall Road in Elgin, Illinois. SMIEKEL got into S/A Bayless’s vehicle and gave an envelope containing $7,000 in United States currency to S/A Bayless. After discussing how SMIEKEL would pay the rest of the fee for the murder, S/A Bayless gave the arrest signal and ATF special agents then arrested SMIEKEL.

Interstate Facilities

15. According to a computer search for the service providers for the cellular telephones that SMIEKEL used to call and to receive calls from S/A Bayless, telephone numbers (213) 509-0487 and (818) 235-3945, the service provider for both telephones is New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, now AT&T on the Web, an international telecommunications company. Each cellular telephone was a facility of interstate commerce.

Conclusion

16. Based on the above information, I have probable cause to believe that JASON W. SMIEKEL has utilized a facility of interstate commerce, namely a cellular telephone, with the intent that a murder be committed in violation of laws of the State of Illinois, with something of value, namely money, being received and promised to be paid in consideration for the murder, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958.
_____________________________
Sarah A. Tucker
Special Agent
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

There are so, so many attorneys walking the hallways in the McHenry County Courthouse whom I do not know.

It was a lot easier when McHenry County’s population was a third its current size–back in the early 1970′s.

Because of population growth, state statute says McHenry County’s 22nd Circuit Court will get two new associate judges.

The details are in the press release below from Chief Judge Michael J. Sullivan:

The deadline for submittal of applications is September 2nd.

The salary exceeds $170,000 per year, according to the State Comptroller’s Office.

Island Lake may switch attorneys from Ancel, Glink to Zukowski, Rogers, Flood and McArdle Monday night.

Ancel, Glink,  you may remember was the firm representing Grafton Township until Judge Michael Caldwell dismissed it in the Linda Moore versus Township Trustees case.  (Ancell Glink continues to represent the Trustees in the separation of powers suit.)

The legal notice is below:

On September 23, I filed an appeal to McHenry County’s denial of my Freedom of Information request for “copes of the bills that were submitted by Special Prosecutor Tonigan,” plus for “any for consultants, investigators, or anything else submitted.”

“No, no, Cal, you can’t see those” is my summary of the reply denying my request.

And, from what I have been told by County Board members, they have not been allowed to see the bill submitted by Henry Tonigan either.

Having served as McHenry County Treasurer, in the United States Budget Bureau, on the Illinois Legislative Audit Commission and various appropriations committees, I’m trying to figure out how county decision-makers can in good faith pay bills on a “trust me” basis.

October 4th the letter you see was sent from the Public Access Counselor’s office of the Attorney General.

Signed by Assistant Attorney General Sunil Bhave on behalf of Public Access Counselor Cara Smith, the letter is a variation of

“Show me the money.”

Or at least how it was spent.

“We have concluded that further inquiry (emphasis in the original) is warranted.

“FOIA does not include a Section 7(1)(c)(viii). While a prior version of FOIA included a Section (1)(c)(viii), FIA was amended on January 1, 200.

“Thus, McHenry County is directed

• to provide us with a detailed explanation as to why it contends that the requested information falls within the purview of the purported exemption.
• Finally, McHenry County is directed to provide us with a copy of the information responsive to Mr. Skinner’s FOIA request for us to review in determining whether any exemption claims have been property asserted.”

Within working seven days, please.

As the Laugh-In Nazi would say,

“Ver-r-r-r-r-r-y

In-ter-r-r-r-es-s-s-s-ting.”