Impact of Veach and Williamson’s Guilty Pleas
The motion to admit the “convictions” is construed as a request to admit evidence of the stipulated facts, and so construed (and unopposed) it will be granted.
However, to the extent that the motion also seeks to “estop Defendants Jeffrey Veach and Thomas Williamson, Sr. from contesting their individual liability,” it goes too far.
The legal conclusions that flow from the stipulated facts, and their implications for various defendants’ liability on the many legal theories asserted in the First Amended Complaint, are matters for analysis in the summary judgment context as discussed below.
But to the extent D5’s motion seeks to “conclusively establish” liability, it will be denied.
Count I – Secondary Boycott
A secondary boycott “generally involves a labor union’s exertion of pressure on a neutral employer with whom the union has no dispute, in order to force the neutral employer to stop dealing with the primary employer.”
Notwithstanding the[e above] admissions, Local 395 argues it cannot be held liable. First, Local 395 argues that no secondary boycott is established because D5, the primary employer, was the principal target of the violence.
[The] facts satisfy the elements of a secondary boycott claim as a matter of law because they show that threats and violence were used against persons engaged in commerce with an objective of forcing Dyer Baptist and Lagestee-Mulder to cease doing business with D5 and hire union labor, and forcing D5 to bargain with Local 395. Unable to dispute what occurred, Local 395 vehemently disputes that it can be held liable for the conduct Veach and Williamson (and other union members) engaged in on January 6 and 7.
The Judge concludes:
As a matter of law on the undisputed facts, Local 395 is liable to plaintiff D5 on Count I of the First Amended Complaint.